Many models of animal signal evolution fail to incorporate an explicit strategy for receivers prior to the evolution of signals. When reasonable assumptions are made for such strategies, we have shown that there is a minimal accuracy of signal coding that is required before receivers should attend to signals (Bradbury & Vehrencamp 1998, Principles of Animal Communication). Depending upon the relative payoffs of correct and incorrect decisions by receivers, this minimal accuracy can be quite high. Here we use this result to explain why so many signals appear to be traits that provided useful information to receivers before becoming ritualized into signals. Our model also supports one prediction of sensory drive models: that latent preferences may selectively favour some signal precursors over others. However, it imposes a serious constraint on sensory drive by requiring that there be sufficient benefits to a receiver to compensate for the costs of disrupting the optimal receiver strategy used before exploitation. Finally, we discuss the overlap between signal honesty and accuracy and show how senders that completely disagree with receivers about appropriate receiver decisions may still benefit by providing moderately honest and accurate signals.
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I t is widely agreed that animal signals modulate decision making by receivers of the signals (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Dawkins 1993; Hasson 1994; Wiley 1994; Guilford & Dawkins 1995; Hurd 1995; Hauser 1996; Johnstone 1997a; Bradbury & Vehrencamp 1998; Owings & Morton 1998) . The degree to which receipt of a signal benefits either sender or receiver necessarily depends on what the receiver would have chosen to do without the signal. Although this seems obvious, many hypotheses for signal evolution do not specify how a receiver might have made its decision without signals. This omission makes it difficult to assess the plausibility of alternative processes for signal evolution.
As an example, a number of authors have recently promoted the notion of sensory drive as a source of new signals (see reviews by Endler & Basolo 1998; Ryan 1998). The common thread in the various forms of these models is that receivers acquire preferences for certain stimuli prior to the evolution of corresponding signals. Because receiver sensitivity to certain stimuli is generated by processes independent of the signalling situation (e.g. prey or predator detection), these models do not require that senders carefully limit signal emission to specific contexts. Ryan (1998) stresses several times in his review that signalling responsiveness can evolve such that benefits to sender and receiver are 'out of concert'. At no point in either review do the authors discuss whether new signals must provide information to be maintained by evolution. In fact, information exchange is not mentioned. Instead, it is suggested that sensory exploitation may be maintained in some cases because it accelerates receiver decision making and thus frees up time for foraging or predator avoidance (Endler 1992; Dawkins & Guilford 1996; Endler & Basolo 1998) , or because the only alternative is disruption of sensory machinery well tuned to prey and predator detection (Kirkpatrick & Ryan 1991; Ryan 1998) . Because these models do not specify what receivers do before suffering sensory exploitation, it is impossible to judge whether sensory exploitation does or does not reduce the suitability of decision making by receivers and thus impose an immediate cost to fitness.
We show below that the strategy for decision making adopted by a receiver without access to signals may be critical to the outcomes of signal evolution models. Prior to the advent of a new signal, there are several possible ways in which receivers might be making decisions. These include (in increasing levels of sophistication): random Correspondence: Dr J. W. Bradbury, Cornell Laboratory of Ornithology, 159 Sapsucker Woods Road, Ithaca, NY 14850, U.S.A. (email: jwb25@cornell.edu 
